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ERADICATING BLAINE'S LEGACY OF HATE:
REMOVING THE BARRIER TO STATE FUNDING OF
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
Brandi Richardson'
In 1995, Cleveland's public school system was in the midst of "a crisis
that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American education.,"
Failing to meet any of the eighteen state standards for minimal
acceptable performance, the entire school district was placed under state
control by order of a federal district court. The proposed solution was a
voucher project that provided financial assistance to families in target
districts such as Cleveland The program was open to religious and
nonreligious private schools, as well as public, community, and charter
schools.4 Under this need-based program, qualifying families received a
tuition grant for private education in the amount of $2250 per student.5
State taxpayers claimed the program violated the Establishment Clause,
J.D. Candidate, May 2004. The author wishes to thank her family-Carol, Hal, Dirk, Brie,
and Erik-for their support and love, Professor Douglas W. Kmiec for his guidance, and
Professor Frederick E. Woods for his inspiration and encouragement.
1. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002). The Court presented the
following data as evidence:
Only [one in ten] ninth graders could pass a basic proficiency examination, and students at all
levels performed at a dismal rate compared with students in other Ohio public schools. More
than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or failed out before graduation. Of those
students who managed to reach their senior year, one of every four still failed to graduate. Of
those students who did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at levels comparable to their
counterparts in other cities.
Id.
2. Id. (citing the district court, which declared the situation "a crisis of magnitude").
3. Jim Whitton, Unanswered School Voucher Questions, TEX. LAW., Aug. 19, 2002
(explaining that Cleveland's very low performance ratings caused the Ohio Legislature to enact
a "voucher program applicable only to Cleveland public schools").
4. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645 ("Any private school, whether religious or nonreligious, may
participate in the program and accept program students so long as the school is located within
the boundaries of a covered district and meets statewide educational standards.").
5. Id. at 646 ("Families with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority
and are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250."). These families were
responsible for co-payment not greater than $250. Id. An additional payment option existed: if
excess scholarships existed after meeting the needs of the priority families, others were eligible
for up to seventy-five percent reimbursement of tuition, which maxed out at $1875, with no co-
payment cap. Id. Different figures applied if a magnate, community, or traditional school was
selected. Id. at 647-48.
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and the Supreme Court consequently evaluated the program in June
2002.6 School choice advocates across America celebrated the Court's
five-to-four decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,7 which affirmed the
constitutionality of the program."
Whatever a party's particular political or philosophical persuasion, the
educational debate recognizes many viewpoints. The fight begins when
the government decides to fund non-public education, and it escalates
when state money funds private, religious schools. 9 Vouchers represent
one method available to states for funding private education.'0 Most
recently, the Supreme Court focused its attention on vouchers in
Zelman.' Because of the Court's broad argument upholding Cleveland's
voucher program, supporters of school choice alternatives predict the
decision will impact other areas of educational reform.1
2
Advocates of voucher programs promote the payment of tuition
subsidies to private schools as the answer to failing public school
systems.' 3  Their solution hinges on concepts of social justice, equal
6. Id. at 648. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that "the
program had the 'primary effect' of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause." Id. Following this finding, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
7. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
8. Holly Lebowitz Rossi, Voucher Battle Shifting to the States, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 11,2002, at A8 (stating that while "school choice advocates rejoiced"
at the Zelman decision, they admitted "there's still a political battle to be fought").
9. Editorial, Carefully Study Voucher Viability, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Sept. 24,
2002, available at 2002 WL 25583057 (predicting that in Louisiana, "[t]he use of state tax
dollars to fund school vouchers for students at private and parochial schools" will be "a
front burner issue" and has already caused "battle lines [to be] drawn").
10. DAVID W. KIRKPATRICK, CHOICE IN SCHOOLING: A CASE FOR TUITION
VOUCHERS 108-09 (1990) (listing alternatives to vouchers, such as full state funding,
realigning school districts equitably, and combinations thereof). See also Robert Holland,
The Supreme Court Upholds School Vouchers,- Ruling Is a Huge Victory, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), June 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4663579 (listing federal and
state tax credits, privatization of public schools, home schooling, and private tutoring as
additional school choice options).
11. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639 (noting the focus of the taxpayers' action was "the
voucher portion of [the] Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program").
12. David G. Savage, School Vouchers Win Backing of High Court Law. The 5-4
Ruling Allows Use of Taxpayer Money to Send Students to Parochial Campuses - It's a
Major Victory for 'Choice' Movement, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at Al (quoting
President Bush as stating, "[tlhis decision clears the way for other innovative school choice
programs so that no child in America will be left behind."); see also, Holland, supra note
10 (stating that "the [Zelman] verdict has broader implications for parental rights and
education reform across the nation").
13. Vouchers Have Overcome, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2002, at AI0 (asserting that
Zelnan did not solve "the urgent problem of failing urban public schools," and that the
next step belongs to politicians who can use Zelman to succeed where they might have
failed in the past).
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opportunity, and a market-driven analysis where competition creates the
necessary impetus for change and improvement.14 These advocates cite
parental choice and benefit to the child as their fundamental concerns."
Opponents claim that state financing of private education undermines
the public school system.1 6 Additionally, many of the private schools in
America today are religious, which causes concern that the state becomes
prohibitively entangled with religion when it funds private education.
7
14. David L. Brennan, Editorial, Free Kids From Failing Schools - Let's Put Aside
the Vestiges of Bigotry and Allow Vouchers - and Children - a Chance, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Sept. 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26324747 ("Failing public schools and
dysfunctional systems are no longer safe from competition. The children of the working
poor and the economically disadvantaged need no longer be sentenced to snake-pit
schools."); see also David Davenport, School Vouchers Are a Viable Solution for an
Education System at Critical Mass, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 18, 2002, available at2002
WL 23275665 (advancing that "the whole school choice movement may be approaching its
tipping point"). The author also asserts that when families begin to realize their access to
"real choices about education ... public schools also will recognize that they face market
competition." Id. The article expands the market analogy to compare the public schools
to a monopoly, opining that "monopolies do not generally serve the public good, and
public education's monopoly on teaching our children appears to be coming to an end."
Id.
15. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Yes to Vouchers, COMMONWEAL, Aug. 16, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 12340851 (arguing that the shift in educational choices from the
state to parents is a policy decision "that rests upon basic beliefs about the dignity of the
person, the rights of children, and the sanctity of the family"). The author concludes by
stating "[t]he point of school choice ... is authentic religious, political, and personal
freedom." Id.
16. Sean Salai, Vouchers Backers Plan More Challenges, WASH. TIMES, July 10,
2002, at A4 ("[T]axpayer dollars should not be spent on private or parochial schools, but
on improving neighborhood public schools .... There is no evidence that voucher schools
perform better than public schools."); see also Doug Oplinger et al., School Vouchers
Upheld. Cleveland's Test Program Meets Constitution, Justices Vote 5-4, AKRON
BEACON J., June 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 6737655 (quoting public school
supporters who project "the ruling will hurt public schools" and that "people are going to
take their attention off improving urban systems and instead run from the systems").
17. See National Center for Education Statistics, Special Analysis 2002 - Private
Schools. A Brief Portrait, available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2002/analyses/
private/sa01.asp (last visited Aug. 27, 2003) (noting that "[79%] of all private schools had a
religious affiliation in 1999-2000," and that of this percentage, Roman Catholic affiliated
schools comprised 30% yet still managed to enroll 48% of allprivate school students); see
also JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 13 (1998) (The
State [by furnishing subsidies] clearly and affirmatively supports religious schooling
without imposing any significant restrictions on the form that such schooling takes ......
Steven Menashi, The Church-State Tangle, POL'Y REV., Aug. 1, 2002. The author states:
Excessive entanglement occurs when a statute necessitates pervasive monitoring
by public authorities in a religious institution. . . . [Tjhe court has maintained
that injecting a secular regulatory authority into the operations of a religious
school would necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position
asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school's religious
mission ... which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses.
2003] 1043
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Most opponents wave the flag of the Establishment Clause as they enter
battle, predicting indoctrination of the masses and the breakdown of
fundamental constitutional principles. 8 Others, echoing the dissent of
Justice Breyer in Zelman, predict a surge in religious strife, manifested
by competion for the government payout.' 9
Touted as a "victory for vouchers,, 20 the decision in Zelman falls
within a line of cases that emphasize a more accommodating approach to
the church-state debate.2 What was seen as an insurmountable wall after
decisions such as Lemon v. Kurtzman,12 the division between church and
state has developed into a more open-minded doctrine, as evidenced in
23 24Agostini v. Felton, Mitchell v. Helms, and most recently, Zelman. Atleast in the area of education, the Court recently focused not on the
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
18. Bernard James, Empowering Educators, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 5, 2002, at C7 (finding
that, regardless of a wide variety of choice, the dissenters in Zelman wanted the issue
framed as "whether the government's choice to pay for religious indoctrination is
constitutionally permissible"); see also Savage, supra note 12 (reporting the opinions of
several opponents of school choice initiatives, including Justice Souter's, who "called the
ruling a 'dramatic departure' from the 'core principle in the establishment clause"').
19. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 720-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing the unique history of diversity in the United States as justification for
preventing state aid to religious schools). Justice Breyer wrote:
The upshot is the development of constitutional doctrine that reads the
Establishment Clause as avoiding religious strife, not by providing every religion
with an equal opportunity (say, to secure state funding or to pray in the public
schools), but by drawing fairly clear lines of separation between church and state
-at least where the heartland of religious belief, such as primary religious
education, is at issue.
Id. at 722-23.
20. Jodie Morse et al., A Victory for Vouchers The Supreme Court Upholds School
Choice, TIME, July 8, 2002, at 32 (indicating that legislatures in a dozen states will be
either reintroducing old choice initiatives or drafting new ones in the wake of Zelman).
21. Tony Mauro, Will Supreme Court Remove State Obstacles For School
Vouchers?, TEX. LAW., Aug. 5, 2002 (offering several cases as examples where the Court
has "frowned on government actions that single out and disadvantage religious practices
and institutions"); see also JOSEPH E. BRYSON & SAMUEL H. HOUSTON, JR., THE
SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: THE BURGER YEARS,
1969-1986 133 (1990) (attributing the change in the Court's direction in religious school
funding cases to key decisions beginning in 1977).
22. 403 U.S. 602, 606-07, 625 (1971) (holding that state statutes that authorize salaries
for instructors engaged in the teaching of secular subjects in religious schools violate the
Establishment Clause).
23. 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (holding that the provision of supplemental remedial
instruction to students on the premises of parochial schools did not violate the
Establishment Clause due to proper neutrality safeguards).
24. 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (holding that the inclusion of parochial schools in a loan
program of educational materials and equipment, including computer hardware and
software, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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program's ability to pass the ever-evasive Lemon test 25 but on the
program's purported "neutrality" towards religion.2 The Zelman
majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held
that:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of
citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause."
,21Calling the Cleveland program one of "true private choice," the Court's
decision signaled an end to the federal battle over state funding of
religious education.29
This Comment considers the current state of government funding
of religious education. It begins by examining the historical reluctance to
entangle the state with religion in the form of financial support for
religious institutions. This Comment argues that where Zelman appears
25. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The Lemon test consists of three
separate provisions: "[f]irst the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally
the statute must not foster an 'excessive government entanglement' with religion." Id.
(quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see PERRY A. ZIRKEL ET
AL., A DIGEST OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING EDUCATION 33 (4th ed.
2001) (discussing further the three-part test and adding a fourth dimension of political
divisiveness as a consideration proposed to the Court); see also supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
26. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. Justice O'Connor, concurring in Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, stated, "as the Court's opinion today shows,
the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach is well under way. A return to Lemon,
even if possible, would likely be futile, regardless of where one stands on the substantive
Establishment Clause questions." Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 721 (1994) (holding that establishment of a special school district to
accommodate a religious enclave was a violation of the Establishment Clause).
27. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. The Court added:
A program that shares these features permits government aid to reach religious
institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual
recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived
endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual
recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of
benefits.
Id.
28. Id. The Court stated, "Our focus again was on neutrality and the principle of
private choice, not on the number of program beneficiaries attending religious schools."
Id.
29. Mauro, supra note 21 (maintaining that although the Supreme Court found that
vouchers may not violate the Constitution, a conflict might still arise between this holding
and state constitutions' prohibitions on government funding of religious schools).
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to have altered the dogmatic adherence to separation of church and state
in the education sphere, the legacy lives on in the states through the
Blaine amendments. The language of these amendments varies
throughout the United States, but their primary function is to block state
funding of religious education. While considered by contemporary
separationists as merely historical context, the nineteenth century
religious discrimination against Catholics and immigrants that created
the Blaine Amendments cannot be set aside in order to justify modern-
day marginalization of religious educators. This Comment considers
various states' attempts to fund religious education despite the presence
of this historical bigotry. This Comment also examines the impact of
Zelman and its implications for future state funding programs. Next, a
major issue left by Zelman is addressed: how to mount a successful
challenge to a blanket prohibition on aid to religious education encased
in a state constitution. This Comment proposes that a combination of
the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection rule reduced from Romer
v. Evans, and the Establishment Clause ruling from Zelman could close a
major loophole that allows states to continue discriminating against
religious education. Finally, this Comment concludes that because these
state provisions were conceived out of religious animosity, they should
no longer prohibit legitimate school choice options in today's evolving
educational landscape.
I. THE STATE BATTLEGROUND: THE REMAINING ROADBLOCK TO
STATE FUNDING OF PRIVATE EDUCATION
A. The Blaine Amendments: A Historical Review of State-Sponsored
Discrimination
Although many decry the Zelman decision as a deathblow to public
education, most supporters and opponents of state funding of private
education recognize that "the [w]ar is [f]ar from [o]ver"3 and that the
battleground is in the states.' Despite the line drawn by the Rehnquist
Court in Zelman, state courts and legislatures continue to clash with
30. Vanessa Blum, Both Sides Head for the Next Battleground; Voucher Proponents
Won a Huge Victory June 27 But the War Is Far From Over and Is Likely To Continue In
the States, LEGAL TIMES, July 1, 2002 ("The next phase of battle will take place in the
states over laws that go further than the Constitution in limiting the way public funds may
be spent on religious institutions.").
31. See id. (quoting Ralph Neas, President of People for the American Way, a group
that opposes voucher programs as stating, "[w]e'll go state to state, city to city, school
district to school district fighting the effort to have vouchers in our nation's schools.").
Neas' legal opponent, Clint Bolick of the Institute for Justice, has focused his organization
on those states "where it is absolutely clear that we could not promote school choice under
the state constitution." Id.
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those parties who seek public funds to support private education
32
systems. This conflict represents one of the remaining issues after
Zelman.33 The first category of issues involves the programs themselves
and their: viability, desirability, need for uniformity, implementation, andS 34
public assessment in the private school setting. This category is not
addressed in this Comment.35 The second issue involves provisions in
thirty-seven states prohibiting state funds from going to private religious
institutions-in this case-schools. This Comment focuses on this latter
issue.
32. Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341, 342-43 (1999) (Professor Volokh describes four key ways in
which "tax money flow[s], through private choices made under neutral funding programs,
to religious institutions:" (1) the GI Bill and Pell Grants; (2) recipients of government
salaries or welfare contributing to religious charities; (3) general exemption of those
contributions for all taxpayers; and (4) vouchers).
33. Whitton, supra note 3 (listing the following as issues of concern: first, whether
private religious schools will "lower their admission standards and establish special
education" programs in order to qualify for voucher programs; second, whether these
schools will accept lower and varying tuition rates set by the state; and finally, whether
private schools will submit to standardized testing).
34. Garnett, supra note 15 (discussing the qualifications of the Cleveland program).
Though not addressed in this Comment, part of the answer to the monitoring question
could be addressed by looking to the decision in Hartmann v. Stone, which held that a
U.S. Army regulation prohibiting on-base family childcare providers from having any
religious practices during day care was a violation of the First Amendment and not
justified by the Army's goal of prevention of excessive entanglement with religion.
Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 975, 986 (6th Cir. 1995). In Hartmann, the Court found
that the Army served as a regulator, not an employer, and that the providers were private,
independent contractors who set terms of care with the parents, including price and
duration. See id at 981. If applied in a religious school funding context, the Court's
decision in Hartmann could impact a challenge to governmental monitoring of religious
schools as the Court found that the Army's funding of the day care programs neither
conferred benefits on religious groups nor qualified as government endorsement of
religion. Id at 981-83. Perhaps the ruling in Hartmann will focus the debate on the
provision of education, rather than a fear of religious indoctrination.
35. For a discussion of these issues, see Richard Lee Colvin and Massie Ritsch, Next
Barrier to Vouchers is Selling Idea to the Public Education: Court Offers Momentum, but
It Has to Be Shown That the Concept is the Answer to the School Problem, L.A. TIMES,
June 28, 2002 at A14. Like the Supreme Court, the focus in this Comment is on the first
test, which involves the constitutionality of the program. As for the second test, "[t]he
jury's still out ... on how well [the voucher] program raises the academic performance of
our students." Id. For further analysis of the viability and desirability of school voucher
programs see JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1999); and KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10.
36. Mauro, supra note 21. For example, Article I, Section 3 of the Florida
constitution states, "No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof
shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect,
or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution." FLA. CONST. art. I § 3.
10472003]
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As identified by analysts, the upcoming legal battles will focus on
state programs and the interpretation of state constitutional provisions.37
States enacted Blaine amendments in the mid-1800s. s  In 1875,
Congressman James G. Blaine of Maine led the charge to amend the
U.S. Constitution to specifically prohibit state revenue from aiding any
religious institution." Though the federal debate on this particular
subject did not emerge until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the
principles behind the legislation predate Blaine .
Growing Catholic and immigrant populations encouraged nativist
sentiments that were already running rampant.4' As far back as the
1780s, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton expressed unease with
the booming immigrant population who brought with them different
cultures, languages, and most notably, politics. These prin'ciples
37. See, e.g., Mauro, supra note 21 (framing the conflict between voucher supporters
and opponents around each side's use of the Blaine amendments to bolster their
positions).
38. VITERIFrI, supra note 35, at 151-54. Though the Blaine Amendment came and
went on the federal scene with the proposal and failure to amend the Constitution by
Congress, the Amendment's spirit lived on in the states that chose to adopt similar
language in their own constitutions.
39. LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825-1925
138-39 (1987) (discussing Blaine's introduction and aftermath of the amendment in the
House of Representatives in December of 1875); see also Lebowitz Rossi, supra note 8.
The proposed amendment read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor,
nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any
religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided
between religious sects or denominations.
JORGENSON, supra, at 138-39.
40. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and
State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 661-67 (1998) (tracing the
educational history of America from the end of the Revolutionary War and discussing the
influence of contemporary politics on the development of public, and subsequently
private, school systems). See generally JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 27-29 (providing an
extensive and scholarly analysis of the growth of the Common School and Anti-Catholic
movements, development of the Blaine amendments, and the early legislative and court
treatment of private religious education).
41. See JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 28 (defining nativism as connoting an anti-
foreign (read: anti-American) spirit). The author points out, "anti-Catholicism is by far
the oldest and strongest form of nativisim .... Anti-Catholicism has been an element of
Western culture since Martin Luther.... It was deeply ingrained in Elizabethan England.
.Id.
42. CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 66-67
(1988) (quoting Jefferson's "Notes on the State of Virginia"). Jefferson asserted that
immigrants rejecting the principles of the governments they left behind would either take
up "unbridled licentiousness" or, if unable to cast off the taint of their upbringing, would
1048 [Vol. 52:1041
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remained a concern in the nineteenth century; however, the focus of the
suspicion became the immigrants' religion, particularly Catholicism.
43
Moreover, the anti-Catholic sentiment of the time was considered
"respectable ... across the Protestant spectrum.''"44 The root of this bias
stemmed from the Americans' inability to reconcile the newly
established concepts of liberty and independence with the "authoritarian
organization of the Catholic Church.
45
Whereas Protestantism was thought to have "giv[en] birth to
republicanism in government," Catholicism was reminiscent of tyrannous
European monarchies and allegedly had "no understanding or
appreciation of civil liberties., 46 A publication from the time, Imminent
Dangers to the Free Institutions of the United States through Foreign
Immigration and the Present State of Naturalization Laws, echoed the
anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant sentiment, and asserted that "emigrants are
selected for a service to their tyrants; not for their affinity to liberty, but
for their mental servitude, and their docility in obeying the orders of
their priests., 47  In light of these cultural biases, any reluctance by
imbue those principles in their children. Id. at 67. Those children would in turn, "infuse
into [legislation] their spirit, warp and bias," resulting in "a heterogeneous, incoherent,
distracted mass." Id. Hamilton found the same danger in heterogeneity, highlighting its
tendency to "change and corrupt the national spirit; to complicate and confound public
opinion; to introduce foreign propensities." Id.
43. Id. at 67-68. (explaining that in the early nineteenth century, the religion of the
immigrants, specifically Catholicism, became the primary reason to oppose the influx of
foreigners). Even when anti-foreign sentiments were highest, "nativist leaders made clear
that they continued to welcome 'respectable Protestant immigrants."' Id. at 68.
44. GLENN, supra note 42, at 68 (discussing the influence of over thirty newspapers
created in the early 1800s that commonly expressed anti-Catholic themes and citing
numerous other publications that denounced "popery" and its works).
45. JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 29 ("This apparent threat to the American way of
life was intensified by the rapidly increasing numbers of Catholic immigrants."); see also
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Immigration had a profound effect on the political and social climate in the mid-1800s, as
between 1850 and 1900, the number of Catholics living in America grew from 1.6 million
to 12 million. Id. A similar growth pattern occurred in the Jewish population. Id.
46. BRYSON & HOUSTON, supra note 21, at 3 (highlighting the need for Catholics to
become part of the "enlightened" citizenry, which included learning "the meaning of great
documents such as the Constitution"). Author Elywn Smith asserted:
The touchstone of Freedom was conscience. If conscience should be taken
captive by spirit of dogma, restrictive education, authoritative rule or coercion,
freedom would die. Here was America's precise and most elemental quarrel
with Roman Catholicism; in the American view-not solely the Protestant view,
much less than that of a tiny band of propagandists-the Catholic conscience,
both in principle and in fact was captive to the Pope.
Id. (footnote omitted).
47. GLENN, supra note 42, at 69. The author of the work, "An American" stated that
the threat was "the notorious ignorance in which the great mass of these emigrants have
2003] 1049
Catholic University Law Review
Catholics to assimilate into the American Protestant culture "promoted
the suspicion [among Protestants] that [Catholics] were indeed subject
politically to a foreign power and therefore could not be trusted to
become 'good citizens. ',4 Education became the major point of
contention between these groups because it was seen as the key to the
American dream.
At the end of the eighteenth century, it was common to use public
funds to support religious education.5 ' However, the majority of the
funding recipients represented the largely Protestant make-up of the
nation." Not surprisingly, schools forming the new "common school," or
been all their lives sunk, until their minds are dead, mak[ing] them but senseless machines;
they obey orders mechanically, for it is the habit of their education, in the despotic
countries of their birth." Id. (quoting Imminent Dangers to the Free Institutions through
Foreign Immigration and the Present State of Naturalization Laws).
48. BRYSON & HOUSTON, supra note 21, at 3-4 (attributing the ensuing education
battles between Protestants and Catholics to this imperfect assimilation in society).
49. See GLENN, supra note 42, at 69 ("The newcomers had not been educated for
participation in a republican form of government and would be fit tools for the conspiracy
to overthrow American freedoms."); VITERITTI, supra note 35, at 147 (discussing the
initiation of a common school for all American children, including immigrants, to attend).
Education was seen as "the great social leveler." Id. For the immigrants not educated or
aware of the American way, the common school was a means to gain that understanding.
The gathering of Catholics in ghettos, paired with increasing influx during events such as
the Irish Potato Famine, demonstrated a seemingly self-created exclusion from the
mainstream, which was considered a threat to the new American society. Id But see
GLENN, supra note 42, at 204 (refuting the assertion that immigrants, including Catholics,
resisted assimilation). Glenn argues that "virtually every immigrant group was in fact
eager to fit into American life and to assure that its children would not suffer under the
stigma of being a foreign element. In some respects . . .parochial schools rivaled the
public schools in their commitment to 'Americanization."' Id Though maintaining group
solidarity, Catholic immigrants in particular "were eager to embrace virtually everything
about contemporary American life." Id. Cf BRYSON, supra note 21, at 2 ("The view of
education proposed by some American immigrants was not compatible with the
'American dream.' The new Catholic immigrants hoped to maintain cultural and religious
continuity "through education.")
50. Viteritti, supra note 40, at 662-64 (explaining that the Bill of Rights did not seem
to preclude state funding of religion as, at the time, "disestablishment was not synonymous
with separation"). After the war for independence, localities still levied taxes in support
of their own minister; in fact, "[t]he first public-education finance law financed public
education with pervasive religious influence - a Protestant public school." BRYSON &
HOUSTON, supra note 21, at 132. Early American public education consisted of publicly
funded religious schools with a pervasively religious purpose. See id Moreover, public
financial assistance was made available to private groups and religious organizations for
nonpublic education. See id. In this period, the focus was on financially facilitating
education, not on qualifying the aid based on the identities and beliefs of the educators.
See id.
51. JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 25 (illustrating that the combination of different
sects, including Baptists, Congregationalists, Lutherans, and Presbyterians made
Protestantism the predominant religion in America in the 1850s). No one denomination,
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public school system, included in their daily routine the teaching of
mainstream Protestantism through reading the King James version of the
52Bible, reciting prayers, and singing hymns. In some cases, Bible reading
was intentionally aimed at the children of immigrants. 3  The public
school system quickly developed a reputation as a Protestant institution
and as "the first line of defense against Catholicism., 54 When leaders of
the Catholic Church began demanding funds for their own public
schools, several school boards decided instead to prohibit "Bible
readings and religious exercises" in the public schools.5 Upset with this
growing "Catholic menace," an alliance formed between Protestant
educators and nativist politicians to preserve their Protestant-based
curricula.56
After a failed campaign to remove the Protestant Bible and prayers
from the public schools, Catholic parishes began creating their own
however, stood as large as the Roman Catholics. Jd. Though only the tenth largest
religious body at the end of the American Revolution, by 1850 the Catholic Church
maintained the highest membership of all religious sects. Id.
52. Viteretti, supra note 40, at 666-68 (recognizing that Jews and some Protestants, in
addition to Catholics, disapproved of the inclusion of the King James Bible in these
schools' cirricula); see also Zelman v. Simmons Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 721 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (discussing the divergence of school systems as Catholics sought their own
funding). Justice Breyer explained:
[T]he 'Protestant position' on this matter ... was that public schools must be
,nonsectarian' (which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and other
Protestant observances) and public money must not support 'sectarian schools'
(which in practical terms meant Catholic).' And this sentiment played a
significant role in creating a movement that sought to amend several state
constitutions (often successfully) and to amend the United States Constitution
(unsuccessfully) to make certain that government would not help pay for
'sectarian' (ie., Catholic) schooling for children.
Id.
53. See GLENN, supra note 42, at 203 (citing laws adopted in Massachusetts in the
1850s under the leadership of the nativist "Know-Nothing" majority, which included daily
reading of scripture, invocation of the Lord's Prayer, and weekly recitation of the Ten
Commandments, all intended to expose immigrant children "to the full program of
Protestant moral teaching").
54. JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 107 (asserting that the common school movement
initially had reluctant support from the older Protestant groups, but this quickly changed
when the Catholic position on the state of public schools came to the forefront); see also
BRYSON & HOUSTON, supra note 21, at 3 ("American Catholics were expected to send
their children to public school where the young could be properly indoctrinated with an
established process for living in a democratic society."). Note the positive presentation of
indoctrination in this context, where modern day "religious/social indoctrination" is
portrayed as an avoidable evil.
55. Viteritti, supra note 40 at 669-70 (contending that the alliance was predicated on
the "launch[ing] of a two-pronged campaign to preserve Bible study in public school
cirricula and to deny government support to sectarian institutions").
56. See id. at 670.
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private school systems as a means of self-preservation.57 Reaction from
the Protestant sector was not favorable, as illustrated by the following
excerpt from the Baptist weekly, Watchman:
If the children of Papists are really in danger of being corrupted
in the Protestant schools of enlightened, free and happy
America, it may be well for their conscientious parents and still
more conscientious priests, to return them to the privileges of
their ancestral homes, among the half-tamed boors of Germany
58
By the time the conflict hit national proportions, the majority of
private schools were Catholic. 59  Responding to political pressure,
President Ulysses S. Grant vowed to propose a constitutional
amendment to prevent the appropriation of public funds for any religious
school.60 James G. Blaine, U.S. Congressman and presidential hopeful,
57. JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 109. Even those in agreement with Catholic
opposition to Protestant-only religious instruction were held out as "following the bad
examples of Catholics in establishing separate schools." See id.; see also Bd. of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 739 n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(remarking on the development of public education in New York City when "[t]he Whigs
swept the city elections that year [1842] and made Bible reading-the King James
version-mandatory in any schools sharing [state] monies. There was nothing left for the
Catholics to do but to build their own parochial system with their own money."); Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 720-21 (2002) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (discussing the
deepening chasm between Protestants and Catholics). Breyer stated:
Catholics resisted and Protestants fought back to preserve their domination.
'Dreading Catholic domination,' native Protestants 'terrorized Catholics.' In
some States 'Catholic students suffered beatings or expulsions for refusing to
read from the Protestant Bible, and crowds . . . rioted over whether Catholic
children could be released from the classroom during Bible reading.
(citations omitted). rd. See generally BRYSON & HOUSTON, supra note 21, at 1-4
(discussing the evolution of the public school from the end of the eighteenth century into
the mid-nineteenth century).
58. JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 107-08 (citing assorted other publications with
similar quotes, such as the Christian Advocate's series of articles titled "The Common
Schools, the Antidote of Jesuitism" and a pronouncement by the Baptist Examiner that
"[t]he Pope hates our free schools").
59. Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV.
117, 138 (2000) (indicating that "[v]irtually all private schools were affiliated with the
Catholic church when the Blaine Amendments were proposed and enacted" and "as late
as 1959, over 90% of private primary and secondary schools were Catholic affiliated"); see
also DWYER, supra note 17, at 15. Department of Education statistics from 1996 indicate
that one tenth of the fifty-two million school-aged children in the United States attended
religious schools. Id. Half of this one-tenth, about 2.6 million children, attended Catholic
schools. Id.
60. VITERITTI, supra note 35, at 152 (making a "highly publicized speech" in 1875,
President Grant promised to "encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar be
apportioned to support any sectarian schools"). Viteritti explains that this position taken
by Grant "plant[ed] the national Republican party firmly in the camp of the anti-Catholic
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was eager to apply his sponsorship to Grant's amendment.6' Blaine, a
savvy politician, recognized the political climate was highly receptive to
the prevailing nativist and anti-Catholic rhetoric that spurred Grant's
62agenda. Many sources, including proponents of the legislation,
recognized the legislative efforts of the time as waging "a general war
against the Catholic Church.,
63
The Blaine Amendment that passed in the House was considered an
innocuous version.64 In the Senate, the proposal underwent heated
debate in the hands of the Republican majority.65 By the debate's end,
the vote was on a much more detailed and controversial version.66 The
wing of the public school lobby, delineating the contours of a bitter partisan struggle that
was to follow." Id.; see also FRANCIS GRAHAM LEE, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 52
(2002) (noting Grant's attempts to turn opposition to aid for religious schools into political
currency, which he hoped would bolster the Republican Party and perhaps "earn him
[another term] as president"). Cf Marvin Olasky, Breaking Through Blaine's Roadblock,
WORLD, Aug. 24, 2002, available at www.worldmag.com/world/issue/08-24-02/cover-l.asp
(last visited Aug. 19, 2003) (remarking on Grant's personal disdain for Catholicism, which
he purportedly called a center of "superstition, ambition and ignorance").
61. VITERrrI, supra note 35, at 152.
62. Id. (casting Blaine as a political opportunist, who referred to his proposed
amendment as correcting a "constitutional defect"). His maneuvering did not go
unnoticed or without criticism, as both sides of the media commented negatively. See id.
For example, Catholic World"issued a condemnation of politicians who hope to ride into
power by awakening the spirit of fanaticism and religious bigotry among us." Id. Cf LEE,
supra note 59, at 53 (noting that Blaine hoped the Amendment would help the Republican
party recover its national prominence after its 1874 midterm election loss of the majority
in the House of Representatives).
63. Viteritti, supra note 40, at 672-73 (pointing out that no federal court ruling existed
at the time of the Blaine Amendment prohibited direct or indirect aid to religious
institutions). Cf Heytens, supra note 59, at 138 ("The conclusion is inescapable: When
politicians spoke of private or sectarian schools during the debate over Blaine
Amendments, they meant Catholic schools.").
64. JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 139 ("The members of the Judiciary Committee of
the Republican-controlled Senate had little patience with the sham House version ....");
see also LEE, supra note 60, at 53 (attributing a significant part of the apathy toward the
House proposal to the debate's focus "on the issue of congressional power in the area of
education"). Id. Perhaps another significant factor was the absence of the author himself,
as "Blaine never spoke on the floor of Congress to the merits of his proposed
amendment." Id.
65. LEE, supra note 60, at 53-54 (remarking on the Senate's substantial alteration of
Blaine's original proposal through numerous amendments); see also Heytens, supra note
59, at 132 (pointing out the frequency of references to the "Catholic controversy" during
the debates on the amendment with the word "Catholic" spoken fifty-nine times that day).
The Pope was referenced almost half as much, as was a papal encyclical on religious
education. Id.
66. JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 139 (stating that a stipulation was added that the
Amendment could not be used to exclude the Bible from public schools). The
Amendment extended the prohibition on aid to religious schools to all forms, not merely
school money, and added an enforcement clause. Id.
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Amendment did not achieve the two-thirds majority necessary to pass
the Senate, yet it "commanded a sufficient congressional majority to
affect policy in other ways.",61 Many state constitutions were changed to
adopt the language of the amendment. More significantly, new states
west of the Mississippi were "required to incorporate Blaine-like
provisions into their new constitutions in order to receive congressional
approval."
69
Currently, Blaine Amendments are still law in thirty-seven states,
70albeit in different versions. Some provisions establish strict guidelines
of separation aimed at preventing direct or indirect aid to religious
institutions.' Other states with Blaine amendments have upheld school
choice variants, notwithstanding constitutional prohibitions that prevent
the allocation of funds to religious institutions. The next section
examines a sampling of these initiatives, providing a glimpse of what has
worked-and failed-on the forefront of educational reform.
B. Pre-Zelman Legal Campaigns: How States and Courts Have
Addressed Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Funding for Private
Education
In their current composition, the state Blaine amendments bar
efforts to provide state aid to religious education, regardless of the
67. VITERITTI, supra note 35, at 153 (citing the Republican's use of the popular
amendment to influence Southern education policy and to use federal aid "as a wedge for
manipulating policy in the states"). Though manipulative, these tactics were not forced on
all recipients, as nationally many states reflected "the spirit of Blaine" in their own
deliberations, and looked to the federal government for guidance as well as for funds. Id.
at 153-54.
68. Salai, supra note 16 (characterizing the states' adoption of the Blaine
amendments as arising from "a thrust by America's Protestant public school establishment
to prevent public funds from falling into the hands of private Catholic schools").
69. Viteritti, supra note 40, at 672-73 (finding this type of language in enabling
legislation for the Dakotas and for admission of states such as Montana, Washington, and
New Mexico).
70. Mauro, supra note 2t (conceding that the amendments "differ slightly in wording
and vintage" but acknowledging that the failed [federal] Blaine Amendment served as a
"template for the state provisions").
71. Viteritti, supra note 40, at 659 (commenting that stricter provisions, aimed
particularly at deflecting aid from Catholic schools are larger barriers to school choice
than First Amendment assertions).
72. "What's Next for School Choice?", Hearing Before the House Comm. on Educ.
and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dean Douglas W. Kmiec, School of
Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.) (discussing the varying
strength of the state provisions, with states such as Washington and Arizona falling on
opposite ends of the spectrum of adherence to their Blaine amendments).
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presence of a legislative mandate.73  Though voucher and other aid
programs are not new, focusing on the contemporary cases allows for a
targeted analysis of the legal and political climate of this issue." The
nation's first full-scale state voucher initiative came in Wisconsin in 1990.
Governor Tommy Thompson approved legislation that gave, through
state funding, low-income Milwaukee parents the opportunity to send
their children to a private, nonreligious school of their choice.7" The
initial success of the program led to its 1995 expansion, which
incorporated religious schools.76 Soon after their inclusion, challengers
succeeded in temporarily blocking the program's implementation.77
In Jackson v. Benson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the
addition of religious schools to the voucher program." The court
adhered to precedent by applying the Lemon test, which requires a
statute to have a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and avoids excessive government
73. Mary Leonard, Private School Aid Efforts Will Face State Challenges: Legal
Barriers Likely to Impede Use of Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 2002, at A29. Analysts
are conservative regarding the expansion of voucher programs. See id They are looking
to state legislatures, which, until the Zelman decision, were reticent to propose school
choice initiatives. See id. Leonard attributes the reluctance to a "lack of political will to
take on teachers unions and civil rights groups that oppose vouchers .... " See id. State
constitutional provisions, in the form of Blaine amendments, are seen as possible
impediments to the growth of voucher programs. Id.
74. VITERITTI, supra note 35, at 223 (stating that "the resolution to the problem
defies political logic because it requires governmental bodies to do what they are rarely
inclined to do"). Viteritti classifies school choice as a "moral question" requiring "nothing
less than a redefinition of public education in America." Id.
75. NINA SHOKRAII REES, SCHOOL CHOICE 2000: WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE
STATES 182 (2002); see also Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998)
(explaining how the first amendment (in 1993) to the original program opened
participation up to 1.5 percent of "the student membership of the Milwaukee public
schools to attend at no cost to the student any private nonsectarian school located in the
City of Milwaukee, subject to certain eligibility requirements").
76. SHOKRAII REES, supra note 75, at 182. A previous legal challenge attacking the
program's disruption of a uniform school district was sustained. Viteritti, supra note 40, at
686 (explaining that of several amendments to the Milwaukee program in 1995, the
addition of religious schools served as the "primary basis for the ... legal challenge").
77. SHOKRAII REES, supra note 75, at 183 (noting that organizations such as the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Nation Education Association, and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People spearheaded a successful effort to
block the program).
78. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607.
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entanglement with religion." It found that the amended school choice
program did not violate the Establishment Clause.0
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's analysis focused on the "general
principle" of neutrality.8' The court found that state funding programs
do not primarily advance religion when public aid is provided "on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor[s] nor disfavor[s]
religion" and manifests from numerous private choices." No excessive
entanglement occurred in the Wisconsin program because enforcement
of minimal performance standards within the private schools would be
the same for secular and religious schools and, in the words of the court,
"this oversight already exists."
8 3
79. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (implying that the major problem
to avoid is excessive church-state entanglement).
80. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 611 ("[Blecause it has a secular purpose, it will not have
the primary effect of advancing religion, and it will not lead to excessive entanglement
between the State and participating sectarian private schools."). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court elaborated further:
A State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by
parents-regardless of the type of schools their children attend-evidences a
purpose that is both secular and understandable. An educated populace is
essential to the political and economic health of any community, and a State's
efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly
serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the State's citizenry is well educated.
Id. at 612 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983)).
81. Id at 613 (discussing a line of cases with an "underlying theory based on
neutrality and indirection": "state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational
assistance directly to citizens in a class defined without reference to religion do not have
the primary effect of advancing religion").
82. See id. at 617 (referring to the eligibility requirements such as residency, income,
random selection and an "opt out" provision as the evidence of neutral, secular criteria).
Therefore, because of the choices made available in the Milwaukee program, which placed
public and private schools on an even playing field of choice, the Wisconsin voucher
program survived the second hurdle. See id. at 61.9. The options available vest "power in
the hands of parents to choose where to direct the funds allocated for their children's
benefit." Id. Thus, the primary effect of these options would not be state advancement of
religion. See id. The court went on to reject petitioner's argument that because a large
portion of the funds went to religious schools, the state was advancing religion. Id. It
warned against focusing on the money rather than the benefit received and pronounced,
"the percent of program funds eventually paid to sectarian private schools is irrelevant to
our inquiry." Id. at 619 n.17.
83. Id at 619-20. The court reasoned, "[l~n the course of his existing duties, the
Superintendent currently monitors the quality of education at all sectarian private
schools." Id. Furthermore, "routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries
into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no detailed
monitoring and close administrative contact between secular and religious bodies, does
not of itself violate the nonentanglement command." Id. (quoting Hernadez v. Comm'r,
490 U.S. 696-97 (1989)).
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Finally, the Wisconsin court evaluated the state constitution.84 Though
the Wisconsin constitution contained more specific language than its
federal counterpart, the court opined nonetheless that both the federal
and state clauses carry the same import and are intended to operate to
serve the same purpose: to prohibit the "establishment" of religion and
protect the "free exercise" of religion." The court found that due to the
neutrality and indirectness of the aid, there was no violation of the
Benefits Clause.86 The court reasoned that no student was required to
attend any religious school or participate in religious activities; thus, both
the selection of and participation in religious schools remained a private
choice. 7  The next year, Maine's and Vermont's tuition voucher
programs were challenged because state monies provided a direct benefit
84. Id. at 620 n.21 (rejecting respondents' argument that the court should be
precluded from examining the Wisconsin provision under federal precedent). The court
recognized that not all questions arising under state constitutions can be "fully illuminated
by the light of federal jurisprudence alone," yet asserted that the tradition of deferring to
federal Establishment Clause guidelines would continue in this case. See id. (quoting
Wisconsin v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996)). The respondents argued that the program
violated both the "benefits" and the "compelled support" clauses of the Wisconsin
constitution. Id.; see also Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 18. The pertinent section of the Wisconsin
constitution states:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend,
erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without
consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be
permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or
modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.
Id. The court cites the above section of the Wisconsin constitution as "Wisconsin's
equivalent of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at
620. Though more specific than the federal equivalent, the court-by applying both
federal and state precedent-found that no constitutional violation had taken place. Id.
85. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 620. The court stated:
A policeman protects a Catholic, of course-but not because he is a Catholic; it is
because he . . . is a member of our society. The fireman protects the Church
school . . . because it is property, part of the assets of our society. Neither the
fireman nor the policeman has to ask before he renders aid 'Is this man or
building identified with the Catholic Church.'
Id. at 618 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). The court made an analogy to
the voucher program, arguing that the students qualified for benefits "not because he or
she is a Catholic, a Jew, a Moslem, or an atheist; it is because he or she is from a poor
family and is a student in the embattled Milwaukee Public Schools." Id.
86. Id. at 621 (asserting that the indirect nature of the aid is the direct payment to the
parent rather than to the schools).
87. Id. at 623. Because the parents had the autonomy to make this choice, no state
compulsion existed. Id. Dissatisfied opponents of the program appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. See SHOKRAII REES, supra note 75, at 183.
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and directly aided both the religious and educational functions of the
schools.8
In both Vermont and Maine, school districts that chose not to maintain
their own public high schools paid tuition for resident pupils to attend
other public or approved independent high schools.8' Originally, Maine's
program was open to private religious schools, but in 1981 the legislature
elected to exclude them.9" Subsequently, parents who sent their sons to a
private Roman Catholic high school brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of the part of the state tuition program that explicitly
excluded religious schools from the receipt of funds.9'
In Bagley v. Raymond School Department,9' the Maine Supreme
Court conducted a legal analysis similar to that of the Wisconsin court.93
In contrast to other programs, Maine's program forwarded tuition
payments directly to the schools, rather than to individual parents; thus,
the specter of "direct aid" to religion presented an insurmountable
88. See, e.g., Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 142-44 (Me. 1999)
(discussing the legal status of school aid programs in other states, including Ohio,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Arizona); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738
A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999).
89. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 131 (stating that the majority of the high school students in
the Raymond School District selected public schools, though some chose to attend
approved private schools); Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 542 (stating that in the 1995-1996
school year, most students attended public schools, while only three attended private high
schools). Maine's tuition program cost approximately $70 million in public funds and sent
almost 14,000 Maine students to public or approved private schools. Bagley, 728 A.2d at
130. For the 1996-1997 school year, Vermont allocated $39,000 for tuition costs at the
Catholic high school selected by fifteen students residing in the Chittenden School
District. Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 543.
90. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 131 (citing the basis for the exclusion as an opinion of the
Maine Attorney General, solicited by the Senate Chair of the Legislature's Committee on
Education, which concluded that the inclusion of religious schools in the program violated
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution). The tuition statute, as
amended, "provide[d] that '[a] private secondary school may be approved for the receipt
of public funds for tuition purposes only if it... fis a nonsectarian school in accordance
with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution."' rd. (quoting ME. REV. ST.
ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2951(2)).
91. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 131. Chevrus High School, the all-male private Roman
Catholic college preparatory school to which petitioners sent their sons, was labeled by the
Maine Supreme Court as "pervasively sectarian." Id. The court's opinion examined the
families' constitutional claims based on the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal
Protection Clauses. Id. at 132. The court also noted that the Maine constitution did not
create greater protections than the federal Constitution; therefore, when undertaking the
analysis of the claims at bar, the two documents were considered coextensive. Id.
92. 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999).
93. See id. at 132 (determining whether the exclusion of religious schools was
unconstitutional, rather than whether the program's inclusion of religious schools violated
the Establishment Clause).
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barrier.94 The court stated: "There were no safeguards within Maine's
system to ensure that state funding was only used for secular purposes.
The amount of tuition was intended to cover the average per-student
cost, which could include expenses for religious classes, religious studies,
and religious events."'5 Unlike the Wisconsin program, which prohibited
compelled participation in religious activities, Maine's program did not
avoid the advancement of religion. 9'
The Vermont tuition reimbursement program failed for similar
reasons.7  Though limiting its program to nonreligious schools, the
school district voted in 1996 to approve payments to Mount Saint Joseph
Academy, a Catholic high school. 9" In response, the State Commissioner
of Education terminated aid going to the school district.99 In Chittenden
Town School District v. Department of Education,"'O the Supreme Court
of Vermont relied on a strict interpretation of the state constitution to
invalidate the inclusion of religious schools in its tuition reimbursement
program."" As in Bagley, the Chittenden court found that a major
94. Id. at 143-45 (stating that the "[c]hoice alone cannot overcome the fact that the
tuition program would directly pay religious schools for programs that include and
advance religion.").
95. Id. at 140. The court also cited controlling United States Supreme Court
precedent, stating that "[i]n the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the
state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and
nonideological purposes, it is clear... [that] direct aid in whate ver form is invalid." Id. at
139 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)).
96. Id. at 144 ("[W]e conclude that the tuition program, without the religious school
exclusion, would indeed have the 'effect' of advancing religion.").
97. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 544 (Vt. 1999).
98. Id. at 543 (explaining that the inclusion of Mount Saint Joseph Academy was part
of a general 1995 policy that the Chittenden School Board adopted, allowing tuition to be
paid to religious schools).
99. Id. (arguing that authorization of payments to religious schools violated state and
federal Establishment Clauses and thus their exclusion from the program was
constitutional).
100. 1d. at 544.
101. See id. at 549 ("The First Amendment prohibits any 'law respecting an
establishment of religion.' [Vermont's] Article 3 prohibits coerced support for 'any place
of worship.' We are not dealing with 'slightly variant phraseology' that can be easily
reconciled.") (quotations and citations omitted). Article 3 of the Vermont constitution
states:
That all persons have a natural and unalienable right, to worship Almighty God,
according to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings, as in their
opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and that no person ought to, or of
right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any
place of worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of conscience,
nor can any person be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen,
on account of religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship; and
that no authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power
2003] 1059
Catholic University Law Review
deficiency in the program was "the lack of restrictions to prevent the use
of public money to fund religious education."'' 2 The court predicted that
schools receiving tuition from district funds would use them to pay the
costs of religious education. 3  Therefore, the repayment scheme
offended the Vermont constitution.'0 Moreover, the court remarked,
"[i]f choice is involved in the Article III equation, it is the choice of those
who are being required to support religious education, not the choice of
the beneficiaries of the funding. ,105
Despite setbacks to state funding programs in Maine and Vermont, the
supreme court of Arizona, in Kotterman v. Killian,'6 upheld a state
statute authorizing tax credits of up to $500 for donations to school
tuition organizations. 7 Taxpayers claimed the credit violated both the
federal and Arizona constitutions."" The Arizona Supreme Court began
its Establishment Clause analysis with the premise that federal precedent
"reflect[ed] an effort to steer a course of 'constitutional neutrality,'
whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the rights
of conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship.
VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 3.
102. Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 562. An "opt-out" provision, which allowed children to
choose not to participate in religious activities, may have strengthened the program. See
id.
103. See id. at 562-63 (arguing that the lack of restrictions on the use of funding could
create an issue of government endorsement of the tuition-funded religious activities).
104. ld. at 562. Despite specification in the Vermont constitution that education be
"encouraged and protected," the court found the limitations of Article 3 did not extend to
public financing of religious education." Id.
105. Id. at 563 (recognizing that whereas the Supreme Court contemplated that
parental choice may eliminate the First Amendment issues, the Vermont court was
unwilling to reach a similar conclusion in light of its own constitutional provision); see also
School Vouchers Review. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Congress (2002) (statement of Reverend Timothy
McDonald, III, Pastor, First lconium Baptist Church, Board Member, People For the
American Way) ("Vouchers could never provide true school choice to parents. Private
schools were established to be selective in their admission of students, thus giving choice
to the private school and not the parent.").
106. 972 P.2d 606, 611 (Ariz. 1999) (indicating that "[t]he encouragement of private
schools, in itself, is not unconstitutional"). The Supreme Court of Arizona asserted that
the addition of private schools would not only help achieve a state's educational goals but
"frequently serve to stimulate public schools by relieving tax burdens and producing
healthy competition." Id.
107. ld. at 609, 621 (discussing the constitutionality of the state tax statute donations to
school tuition organizations (STOs) including: the credit served in lieu of any state tax
deduction; the joint filing of married couples; and a credit disallowance if the taxpayer
designated the donation for the direct benefit of his/her dependent).
108. ld. at 610.
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aimed 'between the avoidance of religious establishment on the one
hand, and noninterference with religious exercise on the other."" 9
The court found that the tax credit allowed all taxpayers to give funds
voluntarily in support of a multi-dimensional education system for the
state, with benefits flowing in several directions. " Though noting that
direct subsidies to religious schools may violate the Constitution, the
court stated, "the Establishment Clause is not violated every time money
previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a religious
institution.1 .. Aside from ensuring compliance with 501(c)(3) tax-
109. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970)).
The court further stated, "[t]his emphasis on neutrality is apparent in a recent line of
Supreme Court cases upholding a variety of educational assistance programs .... Other
courts in recent years have also found state educational aid programs to be in compliance
with the First Amendment." Id. at 610-11 (citations omitted). See supra discussion on the
Wisconsin program in Part I.B.
110. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 616 (noting that where the state provides for free public
education, parents who send their children to private schools are in greater need of
financial assistance). Additionally, the court compared this credit with Minnesota's tax
deduction program, which allowed a deduction for all parents incurring educational
expenses. See id. at 612-14. See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391, 400-02 (1983)
(holding that state income tax deductions for tuition, textbook, and transportation
expenses incurred in educating elementary and secondary school children did not violate
the Establishment Clause, despite inclusion of religious institutions). The Mueller Court
emphasized the extension of tax deductions to a broad class of recipients, not just parents
of private school children. Id. at 397. The Minnesota funds were available as a result of
numerous private choices of individual parents. Id. Citing this distinction, the Arizona
court stated, "[a]s with the program in Mueller... not one cent flows from the State to a
sectarian private school ... except as a result of the necessary and intervening choices of
individual parents." Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 614. Though noting a "mechanical
difference" between credits and deductions, the Supreme Court of Arizona did not find
the distinctions constitutionally significant, as both reduced state revenue and were
intended to serve policy goals and to induce socially beneficial taxpayer behavior. Id. at
612. The court, in affirming Arizona's tax credit program, merely substituted "credit" for
"deduction," and through the same analysis, found the credit constitutional. See id. at
613-14.
111. Kotternan, 972 P.2d at 616 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486 (1986)). The court added, "[pirivate and sectarian schools are at
best only incidental beneficiaries of this tax credit, a neutral result that we believe is
attenuated enough to satisfy ... the most recent Establishment Clause decisions." Id.
Additionally, as the state was not involved in the distribution of funds or in the monitoring
of applications to the school tuition organizations, there was no entanglement. See id. at
616. For this very reason, some school choice advocates have promoted tax credits as "a
superior option that is not only better policy but is more politically viable as well."
Lawrence W. Reed, A New Direction For Education Reform, Mackinac Center For
Public Policy, July 2, 2001, athttp://mackinac.org/article.asp?ID=3541 (last visited Aug. 20,
2003). According to author and education researcher Andrew Coulson, the advantage of
tax credits over voucher programs "is that they restore to the family the direct financial
responsibility for educating their children .... Since all the money involved in these [tax
credit] programs is privately and voluntarily spent, issues of church-state entanglement
and necessary public oversight of public spending are rendered moot." Id. Additionally,
2003]
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exemption requirements, the state merely offered taxpayers another
opportunity to fund education alternatives."' Because the tax credit did
not solely benefit religious schools, the court noted that the primary
effect of the tax credit was not the advancement of religion; therefore it
satisfied the third element of the Lemon test."3
The tax credit/deduction issue was not new, but the dicta rejecting the
dissent's reliance on the Blaine Amendment was a scorching
pronouncement of the court's opinion of the amendment's authority."
4
The court stated, "the Blaine Amendment was a clear manifestation of
religious bigotry, part of a crusade manufactured by the contemporary
Protestant establishment to counter what was perceived as a growing
'Catholic menace.' Its supporters were neither shy nor secretive about
their motives.""..5 The court found no historical proof that directly linked
the amendment to Arizona's constitutional convention, but it stated, "In
any event, we would be hard pressed to divorce the amendment's
language from the insidious discriminatory intent that prompted it.""..6
Coulson finds that tax credits "more effectively promote and protect the conditions that
have historically produced educational excellence: parental choice, direct parental
financial responsibility, freedom for educators, competition among schools, financial
incentive for educators, and universal access to the education marketplace." Id.
112. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 616 (classifying the state's role in the program as "entirely
passive").
113. Id. at 615-16 (rejecting petitioners' argument that the "'pervasively sectarian'
composition of private schools" in Arizona "presumes an inevitable constitutional
breach"). The court stated, "[n]o one yet knows how many taxpayers will take the credit,
what dollar amounts will be generated, or how many students will receive tuition
scholarships." Id at 615. Consequently, the court refused to hinge the evaluation of the
program on "such ephemeral numbers." Id. See also discussion of the Lemon test, supra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
114. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624 (describing the spread of the state Blaine
amendments and stating that "such efforts were unsuccessful at the federal level, [but] the
jingoist banner persisted in some states").
115. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting a national publication which stated, "Mr. Blaine
did, indeed bring forward ... a Constitutional amendment ... and all that [he] means to
do or can do with his amendment is, not to pass it but to use it in the campaign to catch
anti-Catholic votes"). See also JORGENSON, supra note 39, at 138 (pointing out that other
Republicans who possessed a substantially different basis for the federal amendment
asserted that "Catholic opposition was a minor element," but that "states' rights was [sic] a
more important factor"). Blaine's popularity has been credited with the Amendment's
passage in the House of Representatives; nevertheless, this popularity did not translate
into success in the Senate. See id. at 139. The amendment failed in the Senate, and
though he was a likely successor to President Grant, Blaine did not receive his party's
nomination. Olasky, supra note 60.
116. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624. The court also pointed out that parts of the Arizona
constitution were borrowed from the Washington constitution stating, "On several
occasions we have acknowledged similarities between provisions of the Washington
constitution and our own ... [and] while Washington's judicial decisions may prove useful,
they certainly do not control Arizona law." Id. This reference proves significant in the
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C Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: How the Supreme Court Eliminated the
Federal Ouestion
The preceding cases illustrate the propensity for some state courts,
with the right balance of neutral program criteria and open-minded
interpretation of state constitutions, to uphold state funding
opportunities for religious institutions.1 7 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,""
on the federal level, cemented the principles previously addressed by the
Washington, Arizona, Vermont, Maine, and Wisconsin courts."' In
upholding the Cleveland voucher program, the Court asserted that in
order to pass constitutional muster, a program must be "entirely neutral
with respect to religion."'2  Addressing the charge that the program
violated the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court focused on the
program's provisions and ultimately found them to fit within recent
precedent."'
The Court rejected the respondents' argument that vouchers created a
state-sponsored financial incentive to skew the program toward religious
schools.' Tuition aid and co-payment allocations were based on
financial need; if a family selected a private school, checks were sent
forthcoming analysis of Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 2075 (2003), found infra Part I.D.
117. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the cases preceding Zelman, which
attempted to diversify education and funding opportunities.
118. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition
and tutorial aid to families in "any Ohio school district that is or has been 'under federal
court order requiring supervision and operational management of the district by the state
superintendent."' Id. at 644-45 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A)
(Anderson 1999 & Supp. 2000)). Cleveland was the only district to "qualify" for financial
assistance. Id.
119. Seeid.
120. See id. at 662. The Court distinguished preceding cases that could have limited
the challenged program by delineating "neutral educational assistance programs that...
offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to
religion." Id. at 661.
121. Id. at 652. The Court elaborated by asserting:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under
the Establishment Clause.
Id.
122. Id. at 654 ("The program here in fact creates financial disincentives for religious
schools, with private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to
community schools and one-third the assistance given to magnet schools."). Additionally,
a family co-payment was required for private schools, whereas community, magnet, and
public schools required no additional payments. Id.
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directly to the student's parents, who endorsed them to the school.' 3 Of
the 3700 students enrolled in the program, ninety-six percent selected
religiously affiliated schools. 2 4  The program succeeded because it
provided "benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined
only by financial need and residence in a particular school district"-
secular criteria-and permitted "individuals to exercise genuine choice
among options public and private, secular and religious."'5 In the first
federal case decided after Zelman, the Ninth Circuit did not hesitate to
cite the majority's emphasis on neutrality and individual choice when it
upheld Washington's Promise Scholarship Program.
26
D. Zelman's Aftermath: A Glimpse of Conflicting Interpretations,
the Ninth Circuit Versus the State of Florida
In 1999, the State of Washington created a scholarship program for
low- and middle-income students who achieved excellent academic
records in high school. 27 In August 1999, Joshua Davey received such a
scholarship and upon reaching college, declared a double major in
Pastoral Ministries and Business Management and Administration.'
Due to a state-enforced code forbidding recipients from pursuing degrees
in theology, Davey was forced to abandon the scholarship rather than
123. Id. at 646. If a public school was selected, money would have gone directly to the
school. See id. Additionally, a public school would receive the ordinary allotment of per-
student state funding for each student enrolled, plus the $2,250 voucher payment. Id.
124. Id. In the 1999-2000 school year, fifty-six private schools elected to participate;
however, no public schools in adjacent Cleveland districts took part in the program. Id. at
647. The majority dismissed the dissent's focus on both the number of participating
religious schools (making up 82% of the program), and the percentage of scholarship
recipients who subsequently enrolled in those schools (96%). See id. at 658-59. The Court
illustrated the arbitrary nature of the ninety-six percent statistic by showing that this figure
decreases to under twenty percent when the students enrolled in community, magnet, and
traditional public schools are also added to the calculation. See id. The Court refused to
rely on one "snap shot" year to determine the program's validity as participation changes
from year to year. See id.
125. Id. at 662-63 (finding that the decision was "[i]n keeping with an unbroken line of
decisions rejecting challenges to similar programs").
126. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
2075 (2003) ("The Promise Scholarship is a secular program that rewards superior
achievement by high school students who meet objective criteria. . . . [S]cholarship funds
would not even go indirectly to sectarian schools or for non-secular study unless an
individual recipient was to make the personal choice ....").
127. Id. at 750. The scholarship was awarded in the amount of $1,125 in 1999-2000 and
$1,542 in 2000-2001, and students could spend the funds on any education-related expense,
such as room and board. Id. at 751.
128. Id. Davey enrolled at Northwest College, an institution affiliated with the
Assembly of God, whose educational philosophy was distinctly Christian. Id He selected
his course of study in light of his religious beliefs. 1d.
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drop his Pastoral Ministries major. 129  He challenged the program's
limitation on Free Exercise grounds.
130
In Davey v. Locke3 the Ninth Circuit began its analysis citing Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah3 2 for its holding that
"[a] law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or
advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a
religious motivation" will be held to strict scrutiny.13 In Davey, the Ninth
Circuit found that "singling Davey out for unfavorable treatment in an
otherwise neutral program on account of a religious major violates the
Free Exercise rule.' 34 The Davey court found the restrictions to be
discriminatory on their face and that "[ildeologically driven attempts to
suppress a particular point of view are presumptively unconstitutional in
funding, as in other contexts.' ' 35  Despite Washington's interest in not
appropriating or applying money to religious instruction, as mandated by
129. Id. (citing the university's determination that a study of pastoral ministries was a
theology program, and as such the university could not certify Davey's scholarship).
Though he abandoned his scholarship, Davey continued to pursue his major. Id.
130. Id. at 752 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993)). The Court argued that the program's treatment of Davey created an
unfavorable inequality, and alternatively, stressed that a neutral program of broad
applicability cannot discriminate due to religious viewpoints. See id. Davey appealed
from a district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Washington's Higher
Education Coordinating Board. See id. at 751-52.
131. 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003).
132. 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that a city ordinance targeting the ritual slaughtering
of animals was neither neutral nor generally applicable and that its enforcement unfairly
singled out the Santeria Church and its practitioners for discriminatory treatment).
133. Id. at 546 (noting that such a law only survives strict scrutiny in rare cases).
Additionally, in order to pass constitutional muster, the Court concluded that the law at
issue must advance "interests of the highest order" and be "narrowly tailored" to achieve
its goal. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
134. Davey, 299 F.3d at 752. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "a state may not favor,
nor disfavor, religion." Id. This premise relates to the general constitutional prohibition
in the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.; see also Church
of Lukumi 508 U.S. at 531 (asserting that where some may find the Santerian tradition of
animal sacrifice "abhorrent," nonetheless, "religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection").
135. Davey, 299 F.3d at 755 (finding that "a restriction based on religion is aimed at
suppression of dangerous ideas") (citation omitted). The court articulated that "at a
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because
it is undertaken for religious reasons. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious
observers against unequal treatment." Id.
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its constitution, the court did not find this state interest to be compelling
enough to override Davey's Free Exercise interests.
36
The court ultimately found that the government may limit the scope of
a program it funds, but "once it opens a neutral 'forum' (fiscal or
physical), with secular criteria, the benefits may not be denied on account
of religion.' 37  Citing recent Supreme Court precedent, including
Zelman, the Ninth Circuit stated that "the guarantee of neutrality is
respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria
and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse."'38
Finally, though ruling solely on Free Exercise grounds, the court dealt
with the assertion of a state Establishment Clause argument, stating that
the particular provision in the Washington constitution could not
disqualify Davey's scholarship solely because he chose to study
theology.
139
The court acknowledged the Washington constitution's
characterization as being "far stricter" than its federal counterpart and
noted that the Washington courts' rulings were "less accommodating"
than those of the United States Supreme Court.14" Regardless, the Ninth
Circuit held that "[t]he real issue is whether the [state's] interest, no
matter how stringently construed, is compelling enough to outweigh a
credible free exercise challenge under the federal Constitution.' 4'
136. Id. at 760 ("We believe that Washington's interest in this case is less than
compelling."). After considering the neutrality of the program, the individual choice
involved, and the allowance for application of the funds to any education related expense,
the court found that any state funding of religious instruction was "remote at best." Id
137. Id. at 756 (quoting the legislature's declaration that the scholarship program
"regards the higher education of its qualified domiciliaries to be a public purpose of great
importance to the welfare and security of this state and nation" and that the program and
its beneficiaries would "bring tangible benefits to the states in the future.") (citing WASH.
REV. CODE § 28B.10.800). Further, the Governor sent a letter of congratulations to
Davey which asserted that education was society's "great equalizer" and placed members
of society on an even playing field "[r]egardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or income." Id.
Note the absence of "religion" from the list.
138. Id. at 760 (noting that the scholarship program rewarded high school students of
"superior achievement" who met objective criteria, funds were allocated directly to the
students rather than to the schools (sectarian or otherwise), and only the element of
personal choice would direct the funds to a religious course of study or institution).
139. Id. (explaining that because the provision limiting theology students from
receiving the scholarship was defeated on solid Free Exercise grounds, there was no
further need to look at any other constitutional claims).
140. Id. at 758 (noting,,however, that recent state precedent upheld "state funding for
religious worship so long as it passes through private hands first").
141. Id. at 758. The hope is that Davey will bring the debate over constitutional
brinksmanship to the Supreme Court, at which point the conflict between states asserting
their own constitutions' supremacy and those deferring to federal constitutional provisions
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Ultimately, a state's broader prohibition on religion, as based on its
constitution's establishment clause, is limited by the federal Free
Exercise Clause.1
42
In the summer of 2002, Florida asserted a contrary interpretation. In
the wake of Zelman and Davey, teachers' unions challenged Florida's
Opportunity Scholarship Program (Program) in Holmes v. Bush.43  The
Program provided students in schools "failing for 2 years in a 4-year
period" with funds to attend a private school of their choosing. 4 4 The
program's limitations included: the requirement of compliance with anti-
discrimination provisions; selection criteria proscribing entirely random
and religious-neutral acceptance guidelines; and agreement by
participating schools not to compel the profession of faith, prayer, or
worship. 45  Despite these stipulations, the Florida Circuit Court found
that the program violated the state constitution.'4'
On remand from the District Court of Appeals, the court recognized
that under Zelman no federal Establishment Clause issue remained.'
47
Instead, the court relied on "no aid" provision of the state constitution,
which was deemed unique as to its "clarity and breadth."148 The court
stated, "[lit cannot be logically, legally, or persuasively argued that the
receipt of these funds does not aid or assist the [religious] institution in a
will be resolved. See "What's Next for School Choice?", Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 103 (2002) (statement of Dean Douglas
W. Kmiec, School of Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.).
142. Davey, 299 F.3d at 759 (citing Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 779 n.2
(9th Cir. 1993)). The court asserted that a state was free to rely on its Establishment
Clause as long as no Free Exercise infringement existed. Id. (indicating that if a state
grant were paid to a religious school directly, the Establishment Clause concern should
prevail despite a Free Exercise problem).
143. Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5,
2002) (finding "scant room for interpretation or parsing" of the state constitutional
provision prohibiting state aid to religious institutions).
144. Opportunity Scholarship Program, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537 (West Supp.
2003); Leonard, supra note 73 (classifying the legal contest in Florida as "[a]n important
test" but noting that challenges to the state provisions cannot proceed until legislatures
enact education programs of this type). The Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of
Education predicted these enactments "will happen very quickly." Id.
145. Opportunity Scholarship Program, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537 (West Supp.
2003).
146. Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079 at *1 (citing the relevant part of the Florida
constitution, which provides that "[n]o revenue of the state or any political subdivision or
agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of
any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution").
147. See id.
148. Id. at *2 (addressing the findings of similar cases, such as the Wisconsin voucher
program upheld in Jackson v. Benson as controlling precedent, yet rejecting their rulings
in light of a strict reading of the Florida statute).
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meaningful way."'' 49  Though the vouchers were payable directly to
parents, rather than to schools, the court declared, "To hold that this
two-step, payment mechanism avoids the prohibition in Article I, § 3
would be the functional equivalent of redacting the word 'indirectly'
from this phrase of the Constitution. Moreover, such an interpretation
would amount to a colossal triumph of form over substance."'5 The
court recognized the policy goal of creating educational opportunities,
yet refused to turn its back on what it termed "the clear mandate of the
people as enunciated in the Constitution."''
II. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? USING THE FREE EXERCISE AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES TO DEFEAT STATE SPONSORED
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah: The Roadmap to
Free Exercise Protection
Considering such a recent pronouncement from the Florida court, is
there a way to defeat this constitutional mandate?'52 Some advocate the
Zelman decision as "settling the constitutional question" and "lifting the
constitutional cloud that has been hanging over school choice
programs."'53  Still others think it would be incorrect to conclude
149. Id. The court asserted that the language of the provision "is clear and
unambiguous. There is scant room for interpretation or parsing .... [Clourts are duty
bound to give plain meaning to the words and phrases being reviewed and .. .are not
permitted to fashion or employ a strained construction to reach a result not intended." Id
150. Id. at *2 (stating that the distinction that payments go directly to the parents, who
then make an independent choice of where to send their child, is an "appealing" yet
meritless argument).
151. Id at *3 (saluting the purpose of the scholarship program as "enhanc[ing] the
educational opportunity of children caught in the snare of substandard schools"). Note
the marked difference between the Davey court's willingness to adhere to the federal
constitutional example and the Florida court's steadfast adherence to its constitution's
dictates.
152. Don't look to N. Y to Embrace School Vouchers, NEWSDAY, June 30, 2002 at B2.
One commentator opined that the only redress for the citizens of New York State, who
were facing a battle similar to those in Florida, was to amend the state constitution. Id In
his opinion, "If it happened tomorrow, 2007 would be the soonest that vouchers might be
legal in New York." Id.
153. Morse, supra note 20 (showing that with the burst of post-Zelman enthusiasm,
"pro-voucher legislators ... immediately set out to pump political life into the moribund
education-reform movement"); see also Savage, supra note 12 (quoting Secretary of
Education Rod Paige, who declared that the Zelman decision "will open the doors of
opportunity to thousands of children who need and deserve the best possible education").
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controversy over school choice is out of the "legal woods. '54 States such
as Florida, which base their strict laws and enforcement on their
constitutional no-aid provisions, will become the targets of challenge in
the coming months. 5 What is missing is a way to undermine the state
constitutional provisions that prohibit state allocation of aid to religious
educators. In addition to the favorable analysis in Davey, the Supreme
Court decisions in Church of Lukumi and Romer v. Evans provide
insight to the solution.'
At issue in Church of Lukumi were several city ordinances prohibiting
religious animal sacrifice.' The Church and its congregants practiced
Santeria--a religion of West African and Cuban origins-which
represents a melding of traditional African and Roman Catholic
elements. The district court asserted that the government's interests
were compelling enough to overcome the infringement on the
petitioners' religious practices.5 9  In its review, the Supreme Court
154. Garnett, supra note 15 (attributing the obstacle to school choice to state
constitutions, and opining that education "reformers should expect ... trouble from the
Know Nothing policies still embedded in many states' laws").
155. See Blum, supra note 30. Those mounting challenges focus on seventeen of the
thirty-seven state provisions currently construed to prohibit religious aid as posing a
"serious threat" to voucher plans. Mauro, supra note 21. While some predict Missouri
and Texas as the next phase in the state battle against the Blaine amendments at the state
level, the post-Zelman fight has already undergone its first rounds in Washington and
Florida. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075
(2003) and Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5,
2002); see also supra Part I.D.; Tony Mauro, Voucher Advocates Plan Next Push to High
Court, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 5, 2002, athttp://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id
=1024079086859 (last visited Aug. 21, 2003) (quoting the Institute for Justice, which is
targeting the Florida voucher program as "the next battleground for school choice").
156. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(1993) (holding that a legislature cannot create a means to persecute an unpopular religion
or its practices); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding that a law may not
single out a politically or socially unpopular group for disparate treatment).
157. Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 527 (discussing the development of the
ordinances, including the solicitation of the opinion of the state attorney general who
"advised that religious animal sacrifice was against state law, so that a city ordinance
prohibiting it would not be in conflict").
158. 1d. at 524-25 (identifying use of Catholic symbols including saints, attendance at
Catholic sacraments, and the sacrifice of animals in recognition of the Old Testament, as
parts of the Santerian faith). The sacrificial element arises in connection with spirits called
orishas, who enable the fulfillment of individual destinies through their "aid and energy."
Id. at 524. In order for these mortal spirits to survive, sacrifices must be performed at
significant times such as birth, marriage, death, sickness, initiation, and annual
celebrations. Id. at 525. Santeria ministers kill the animals by severing the carotid (neck)
arteries and the members usually cook and eat them (depending on the particular
ceremony). Id. Animals used include chickens, doves, ducks, goats, and sheep. Id.
159. Id. at 529 (finding that "at most, the ordinances' effect on petitioners' religious
conduct was 'incidental to their secular purpose and effect"') (quoting Church of the
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performed a thorough examination of the ordinance that included Free
Exercise and Equal Protection elements. 16,
The Court began its analysis with the fundamental requirement that a
law must be neutral and of general applicability where the effect burdens
a particular religion., 61 Should the law fail this test, the government must
provide a narrowly tailored, compelling government interest to justify
• 162
the infringement. The Court stated, "if the object of a law is to infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is
not neutral.' ' 63 It had little difficulty concluding that the Santerian rituals
were "the object of the ordinances." '64 The Court warned that even if the
law was neutral on its face, "[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct
for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with...
facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt."'
6 5
The Court used an Equal Protection analysis to bolster the neutrality
argument, discerning the city council's intent from direct and
circumstantial evidence. 66 Within the list of relevant evidence, the Court
cited the legislative and administrative history, events preceding the law's
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1484 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
Though admitting to the lack of religious neutrality, the district court found that "the city's
concern about animal sacrifice was 'prompted' by the establishment of the Church in the
city..." and that "the purpose of the ordinances was not to exclude the Church from the
city but to end the practice of animal sacrifice, for whatever reason practiced." Id.
(citations omitted). The judgment of the district court was upheld by the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 530.
160. Id. at 531-40 (arguing primarily on the Free Exercise issue and using Equal
Protection principles to bolster the position, as well as highlighting Establishment Clause
concerns).
161. Id. at 531 (citing the test established in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res.
of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) which states, "neutrality and general applicability are
interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a
likely indication that the other has not been satisfied").
162. Id at 531-32. The district court found four compelling state interests, asserting
health risks, "emotional injury to children" observing the rituals, "protect[ion] [of] animals
from cruel and unnecessary killing," and restriction of slaughtering/sacrificing to certain
areas zoned for that purpose. Id. at 529-30.
163. Id. at 534 (finding facial neutrality as the minimum standard, meaning that if a
law "refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language
or context," the law fails that requirement).
164. Id. at 534-35 ("Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is
strong evidence of its object.").
165. Id. at 534 (noting "[flacial neutrality is not determinative" and that the Free
Exercise Clause "forbids subtle departures from neutrality").
166. Id at 540 (finding "[t]he ordinances were enacted 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' their suppression of Santeria religious practice [and this] is revealed by the events
preceding their enactment" (citations omitted)).
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enactment, and statements made by lawmakers. '  Finding significant
facts on record, it concluded that the lower court erred in judging the
ordinance neutral.68  Finally, the Court considered the general
applicability of the ordinances, recalling that, "inequality results when a
legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are
worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious
motivation.' 69 Criticizing the transparency of the law at issue, the Court
concluded, "the ordinances 'ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition
that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not
upon itself.' '1 70  The Court upheld the Free Exercise Clause's
commitment to religious tolerance by striking down the ordinances
because they failed to serve a compelling government interest. 7
B. The Romer v. Evans Solution: Invalidating Laws Based on Their
Historic Intent
Romer v. Evans focused on an amendment to the Constitution of the
State of Colorado referred to as "Amendment 2. ",172 Amendment 2
repealed ordinances passed in various Colorado municipalities
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."'' 73  The State
167. Id. The Court reviewed taped city council meetings that "evidence[d] significant
hostility exhibited by residents, members of the city council, and other city officials toward
the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice." Id. at 541. The audience at the
meetings alternately cheered supporters and taunted opponents of the ordinance. Id
168. Id. at 542 (emphasizing the animosity towards the Church, the focus of the law on
its particular practices, the structuring of the law to prevent religious killings (but
excluding secular killings), and the suppression of more conduct than necessary to achieve
the stated objective).
169. Id. at 542-43 (conceding that where "[a]ll laws are selective to some extent ...
categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of
burdening religious practice"). Furthermore, protecting against selective government
imposition of burdens is an essential part of Free Exercise guarantees. Id.
170. Id. at 545-46 (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). The Court added that this type of
lawmaking is "the precise evil ... the requirement of general applicability is designed to
prevent." Id.
171. Id. at 547 ("Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed
to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws here in question were enacted
contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void.").
172. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996) (attributing the impetus for
"Amendment 2" to the reaction to local ordinances passed in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation).
173. Id. at 624. The entire text of the amendment reads as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
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argued that the referendum amendment did "no more than deny
homosexuals special rights.' ' 74 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
State's argument. 115 The majority viewed the change in legal status as
putting homosexuals in a "solitary class with respect to transactions and
relations in both the private and governmental spheres. "6 In Romer, the
Court analyzed the contested state amendment on Equal Protection
grounds, with a special emphasis on the legislative history, making the
rationale behind the law's enactment as important as the law itself.1
7
The Court began with the proposition that "no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws" as provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The majority recognized that the reality of modern
lawmaking requires the classification of groups and the likelihood that
some will be disadvantaged whatever the outcome.179 However, unless a
law targets a suspect class 8" or burdens a fundamental right,18 ' it will be
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
respects self-executing.
Id.
174, Id at 626. The Court found the amendment withdrew "from homosexuals, but no
others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids
reinstatement of these laws and policies." Id. at 627.
175. Id. at 632 (finding that the "sheer breadth [of the legislation] is so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects").
176. Id. at 627 (rejecting the Supreme Court of Colorado's argument that the
amendment was subject to strict scrutiny based on the infringement of a fundamental right
of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process). The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed its judgment, but on a different Equal Protection rationale. Id. at 625-26. The
Court asserted that the amendment prevented homosexuals from receiving protection
from injuries addressed through the municipal ordinances such as discrimination in
housing, real estate sales, health and welfare services, education, and employment. Id at
629-30 (noting that the repeal of the local measures affected even general laws preventing
arbitrary discrimination (e.g. measures not referencing sexual orientation) in government
and private settings). The Court argued that instead of depriving homosexuals of special
rights, the amendment in fact imposed a special disability. Id. at 631.
177. See id. at 632-35 (insisting on finding the connection between the intended
interest and the classification). The Court found that this link enhances Equal Protection
safeguards while providing guidelines for the legislature to follow during the legislative
process. See id.
178. Id at 631.
179. Id (distinguishing the "practical necessity" of classification from the withholding
of protections others enjoy in a free society).
180. ZIRKEL, supra note 25, at 11, 13 (explaining that the term "suspect class" refers to
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or alienage). The term
"suspect class" necessitates the application of strict judicial scrutiny in cases where courts
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upheld as long as the government provides a rational basis.'82 Assessing
the merits of Amendment 2, Justice Kennedy found no rational basis to
justify the law."' Justice Kennedy further asserted that "laws of the kind
now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.' 1 In
order to validate the provision of Equal Protection of the laws, a simple
desire to harm a politically unpopular group, without more, would not
amount to a legitimate governmental interest."' The Court concluded
find an "indication that the class is saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness, as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Const. L. § 817 (2003).
181. ZIRKEL, supra note 25, at 11 (discussing fundamental rights (liberties) such as
textual rights found within the Bill of Rights and non-textual rights such as the right to
privacy). An alleged abridgment of a fundamental right by a law or statutory provision
compels strict scrutiny from the courts, which requires that the state "demonstrate that the
statute serves a compelling state interest, and that the state's objectives could not be
achieved by any less restrictive measures." See 16A AM. JUR. 2D. Const. L. § 387 (2003).
182. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-33. Though the Court noted that the
referendum singled out a particular group for disparate treatment, it failed to apply a
traditional Equal Protection "suspect class" analysis. See id. The level of scrutiny
applicable to this case appears to be a mix of strict and rational basis tests, resulting in a
hybrid "heightened scrutiny." Id. The Court rejected the argument that "Amendment 2
[was] intended to conserve resources to fight discrimination against suspect classes." Id. at
630. Though seeming to classify homosexuals as a target group worthy of special
protection, the Court resorted to a "rational basis" analysis as the framework for its
invalidation of the legislation. Id. at 630-31. The Court elaborated on the rational basis
test, stating, "by requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an
independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." Id. at 633. Arguably, if
the amendment could not pass at a more accommodating level of scrutiny designed to
provide for legitimate state interests, application of strict scrutiny would be unnecessary.
Id.
183. Id. at 632. The Court declared:
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this [rational basis] inquiry. First, the
amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group, an exceptional, and as we shall explain,
invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests.
Id.
184. Id. at 634 (indicating that where incidental disadvantages can be explained
through legitimate state interests, Amendment 2 "inflicts on [gays and lesbians]
immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications
that may be claimed for it"). Id. at 635.
185. Id. at 634-35 ("Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes often can be
explained by reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental
disadvantages they impose on certain persons.").
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that Amendment 2's purpose was to make homosexuals unequal to
everyone else."86
In light of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection standards evaluated
above, what are the consequences for states featuring Blaine
amendments when both are applied in conjunction with the Zelman
decision? The result would be the invalidation of the amendments based
on their intentional infringement of constitutional rights as evidenced by
bias present at their inception. The historical impetus of hatred and
animus for immigrants, especially Catholics, could invalidate these
provisions in modern courts."7
C. Applying Church of Lukumi andRomer to the Blaine Amendments
With the above in mind, the argument returns to the funding of private
religious education. Church of Lukumi provides an excellent framework
within which Romer and Zelman neatly fall."" Under a Free Exercise
analysis, the Blaine amendments are first assessed in terms of their
neutrality and general applicability. "9  Do the "no-aid to religious
institutions" provisions found in state constitutions meet the requisite
standards? The obvious answer is no, as they apply only to educators of
a religious nature, not to secular private schools.' 9° What is the context
behind that distinction? According to the majority in Church of Lukum,
the distinction comes from the "historical instances of religious
persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the
Free Exercise Clause."' 9' One need look no further than the nineteenth
century political and social campaigns waged against immigrants and
Catholics to identify such discrimination,
9 2
186. Id. at 635 (holding, "A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws.").
187. See supra Part I.A for an analysis of the steps taken to politically and legally
legitimize the social climate of religious and cultural intolerance during the 1800s.
188. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Church of Lukum.
189. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-
32 (1993). According to the standard set in this case, the Blaine amendments must be
either facially neutral and generally applicable or will be otherwise subject to strict
scrutiny. Id.
190. Volokh, supra note 32, at 341 (stating that the "heart of the Establishment Clause
debate over school choice" lies with the question of whether the government can "exclude
religious schools from ... generally available benefits" and whether the discrimination is
"constitutionally mandated").
191. Church of Lukum, 508 U.S. at 532-33 (asserting that "a law targeting religious
beliefs as such is never permissible").
192. See supra Part i.A for discussion of the pre-Blaine movement. See also Mauro,
supra note 21 (quoting Kevin Hasson, executive director of the Beckett Fund for Religious
Liberty, who stated that the Blaine amendments "enshrine bigotry in two-thirds of our
states in a profoundly un-American way").
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Mindful that the government may not conduct "covert suppression of
religious beliefs," the Blaine amendments do not even pretend to achieve
any end other than to single out religious schools for disparate
treatment.193  The disparity at hand lies in funding, and where
government is not required to subsidize religious practice, "once it opens
a neutral forum (fiscal or physical), with secular criteria, the benefits may
not be denied on account of religion.' ' 94 The Church of Lukumi Court
advised considering "the effect of the law in its real operation" and
instructed that an evaluation of neutrality requires "an equal protection
mode of analysis" where "direct and circumstantial evidence" provide
insight into the legislators' intent.195
Under a Romer Equal Protection analysis, the intent behind the
legislation is crucial to verifying the government's stated interest.' 96 As
previously discussed, the bigotry prevalent in the late nineteenth century
prompted many states to pass Blaine amendments to block the funding
of non-public, and at that time, non-Protestant, schools. 97 This historic
discrimination recalls Justice Kennedy's admonition against "laws of the
kind now before us ...born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected."' 9 It would be impossible to argue that the intent of the Blaine
amendments was not to "harm a politically unpopular group."'9 9 The
very purpose of the Blaine amendments was to make Catholics and
immigrants "unequal to everyone else," a constitutionally impermissible
193. Church of Lukumih 508 U.S. at 534 (noting that the Free Exercise Clause "forbids
subtle departures from neutrality").
194. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the recipient of the
scholarship risked the disapproval of the state when selecting a religious course of study,
thus the prohibition was related to an unconstitutional limitation on free speech).
195. See Church of Lukuml] 508 U.S. at 535-40 (discussing the value of utilizing the
Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence to determine whether the law at issue is neutral).
196. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996). See supra notes 180-82 and
accompanying text on Justice Kennedy's argument for considering legislative purpose
when applying the "heightened scrutiny" to state action.
197. See supra Part .A; Cf Romer, 577 U.S. at 633 (stating that "[if] the adverse
impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would
be suspect" (quoting R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). Applying the Romer standard to the genesis of the Blaine amendments
(that is, legislation motivated anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant sentiment), heightened
scrutiny would be necessary. See id.
198. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634. To find the vulnerability in the Blaine amendments,
one must merely replace the references to "homosexuals, gays/lesbians" in Romer with
"Catholic, Jewish, or religious" references.
199. Id. Though in modern times the Catholic Church could not be classified as a
politically impotent organization, the focus is on the creation of the legislation, which
dates back to the nineteenth century, nativism, and James Blaine. See supra Part L.A for
historical analysis of the Blaine amendments.
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legislative end. 200 Like the ordinances aimed at Santeria worshippers, the
Blaine amendments have "as their object the suppression of religion."' '
Due to the lack of neutrality and general applicability, the Blaine
amendments are subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
framework. This standard requires a compelling state interest and
narrowly tailored laws.03  Voucher opponents would assert that,
"[t]hough the Blaine [a]mendments date from an era of anti-Catholic
sentiment . . . they were based on the principle of church-state
separation, an idea 'that had nothing to do with anti-Catholicism and
everything to do with protecting and strengthening the institutions of
both church and state. ' '' 2°' This argument fails because the Zelman Court
solved the church-state separation issue by providing guidelines for
school choice programs to avoid Establishment Clause (i.e. church-state
separation) issues.0 5 If the highest court in America can validate the
provision of state aid to religious schools through a neutrality test while
maintaining its adherence to the core values established by the First
200. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (stating that a legislature cannot decree a "class
of persons a stranger to its laws"). Applying this assertion to the educational choice issue,
the "class of persons" targeted are those who attend religious schools, and the declaration
of "strange"-ness is found in legislation that prevents the state from funding religious
education. As one historian commented, the motivation for this exclusion had no
legitimate state interest:
[A]id to religious schools did not become a controversial subject in America until
the Catholics started to demand the same support for themselves. The refusal of
public authorities to grant such aid did not arise from any well-established
constitutional doctrine or from a high-minded desire to protect religious
freedom, but rather from a raw hatred of Catholics, especially the Irish.
VITERITTI, supra note 35, at 152 (footnote omitted).
201. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(1993) (noting that "[t]he pattern" disclosed by the Court shows "animosity to Santeria
adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target this
religious exercise"). Comparing this assessment with the Blaine amendments, a similar
"pattern" emerges in the treatment of Catholics and immigrants whose religious activities
became the targets of repressive legislation.
202. See, e.g., id. at 531 (stating that the Court's Free Exercise cases establish that if a
law is neutral and generally applicable, the law "need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest").
203. See, e.g., id. at 531-32 (stating that "[a] law failing to satisfy these requirements of
neutrality and general applicability must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest").
204. Leibowitz, supra note 8 (quoting Rabbi David Sapperstein, Director of the
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism).
205. See "What's Next for School Choice?", Hearing Before House Comm. on Educ.
and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 91-104 (2002) (statement of Dean Douglas W. Kmiec,
School of Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.) (asserting that
"Zelman establishes that Congress may fund religious and nonreligious school choice
opportunities alike").
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Amendment's religion clauses, the states cannot offer an Establishment
206Clause argument to defeat similar provisions .
Consequentially, the asserted state interest-avoidance of an
Establishment Clause violation-was not compelling enough to override
the Free Exercise interests of parents desiring to educate their children in
religious schools.' °7 Even the exception taken by the Florida court in
Holmes, noting the unique "clarity and breadth" of the Florida
• • 208
constitution's establishment clause, could not sustain this analysis. The
effect of the Florida provision is significantly overinclusive because its
prohibition on aid to religious schools is not predicated on any standardS 209
of indirect payments, true private choice, or "opt out" mechanisms. In
cases such as Florida's, the failure to narrowly tailor the stated interest is
210the last step in voiding the prohibition °. In the final words of the
Church of Lukumi Court, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause commits
government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion
... [of] animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must
pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the
rights it secures." ''
III. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE: How RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PREDICT SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THE BLAINE LEGACY
Some reject the "relevance of this ugly episode in our country's
history" in favor of a test reflecting "an institution's ... contribution to
206. See id. at 103 (stating that "to the extent that the Bagley court avoided a federal
equal protection violation for including private, but not private religious schools, in tuition
reimbursement plan based on the need to avoid a federal Establishment Clause violation,
Zelman changes that calculus entirely").
207. See, e.g., Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 2075 (2003); cf Bagley v. Raymond School Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 131 (Me. 1999)
(noting that one of the named petitioners asserted that her selection of a religious high
school for her son was a "personal faith choice").
208. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
5, 2002). See also supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text for the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the validity of state constitutions overriding federal Free Exercise
interests.
209. See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text for a discussion on the particulars
of the Florida Program and the court's admission that no federal Establishment Clause
issue existed.
210. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Following a Zelman approach, if
the program offered is based on neutral, secular criteria, there is no need to find the
inclusion of religious schools unconstitutional. Id.
211. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993) (remarking further that "[t]hose in office must be resolute in resisting importunate
demands and must ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of laws and
regulation are secular").
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society, not its historical origins .... ,, However, the haunting words of
the Arizona Supreme Court in Kotterman v. Killian offer the opposite
conclusion: "In any event, we would be hard pressed to divorce the
amendment's language from the insidious discriminatory intent that
prompted it. ' ' 3 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari for Davey v.
Locke,24 in which it will be forced to "examine and finally bury what
voucher advocates see as an ugly but little-known piece of American
history, when anti-Catholic fervor swept the nation and fueled passage of
these state constitutional amendments."2 5 The goal will be to convince
the Court that Blaine's legacy should not serve to disqualify deserving
recipients of aid, whatever their religious persuasion.26
212. K. Hollyn Hollman, Editorial, Dredging Up Ugliness in the Name of Vouchers,
WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2002, at A23.
213. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999); see also supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
214. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075
(2003). The Court may again confront the issue if certiorari is granted to Holmes v. Bush,
No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002). See supra Part I.D
for a review of the cases cited.
215. Mauro, supra note 21. One remaining issue is the proposition that if a state
reauthorizes its constitution and explicitly acknowledges and rejects the previous historical
impetus for its Blaine amendment, the religious bias is expunged. See Heytens, supra note
59, at 149-50 for more information on this proposal. Therefore, the proposed analysis
stemming from Romer v. Evans could not assail the targeted provision. See id. In states
such as Florida, which have undergone this exercise, there may be no way around the
Blaine amendment save constitutional amendment or Supreme Court instruction.
216. Menashi, supra note 17 (quoting Justice Brennan who wrote, "The Establishment
Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it,
simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore
subject to unique disabilities"). A small wrinkle is the Florida court's rejection of this
argument by refusing to consider the legislation's background to determine its current
validity. Holmes v. Bush, 2002 WL 1809079, at *2. The court wrote, "the intent of the
legislature, always an elusive and debatable commodity, is not determinative of any
particular enactment's facial constitutionally [sic] in Florida." Id. Despite this
pronouncement, a recent development in Florida has cracked open the door of
opportunity to vouchers in the state. Judge Permits More School Vouchers, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, available at
http://www.floridians.org/newsf/02/081002.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). On August 9,
2002, four days after his initial decision, the same judge who held that the Florida
Opportunity Scholarship violated the state constitution approved the issuance of several
hundred more school vouchers for the coming school year. Id. An automatic suspension
of the ruling occurred when an appeal was filed, but rather than allowing wholesale access
to the program during the review of the decision, the judge offered a "hybrid solution to
allow the expansion but protect the financial interests of the public schools involved if the
courts uphold his [earlier] decision." Id.
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CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that in light of the sweeping decision in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the question of whether voucher (and other
educational choice) programs violate the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution has been answered in the negative. Prior
decisions such as Kotterman v. Killian and Jackson v. Benson began the
process that would lead to the Zelman decision. It is up to the cases
following Zelman, such as Davey and Bush, to apply the federal test to
the states."' In the absence of a federal claim, as will most likely be the
case, school choice proponents should access the sound resources found
in the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses to address their need
for equal treatment in the educational field. The historical background
of the Blaine amendments has demonstrated a foundation of religious
hatred and bigotry. Therefore, the provisions it spawned could not be
upheld, regardless of their present day interpretations. If today's
children are to have an optimal chance at educational success, they must
be afforded real and substantial choices. The antiquated notions of
nineteenth century legislators should not prevent students from accessing
their choices, regardless of religion. And if a state desires to fund that
religious education, the Constitution will not stand in its way.
217. See Ellen Sorokin, 6 Families Challenge Maine Over Tuitioning Exclusion,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002 (commenting on recent litigation in Maine, which revisits the
Bagley decision. Six families have filed a lawsuit challenging the 1981 law that removed
religious schools from the tuition voucher program. See id. The attorney for the families
stated that "the state's exclusion of religious schools had no legal standing since the U.S.
Supreme Court this summer upheld the constitutionality of a voucher program in
Cleveland affirming that parents in neutral school choice programs were free to choose
religious options under the Establishment Clause." Id. In Washington State, another
challenge has developed, targeting state policy "forbidding students at public universities
from student teaching in private religious schools." Paul Queary, Lawsuit Strikes At Ban
On Tax Money To Private Schools, THE COLUMBIAN (Clark County, Washington), Sept.
27, 2002, at C2. The petitioners in the case are a Seventh-Day Adventist pursuing a
teaching degree and a Roman Catholic Master's Degree candidate. Id. Both plan to teach
in religiously affiliated schools upon completion of their studies. Id. Attorneys for the
petitioners credit the strength of their case on the recent rulings of both Davey and
Zelman. Tan Vinh, Limits on Student Teachers Targeted, Suit Filed Against Ban On
Parochial-School Work, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1. The litigation in both the
Maine and Washington cases contributes to the realization of a larger goal: defeat of the
Blaine amendments which aim to prevent use of public money for religious schools.
Queary, supra at C2. These cases will be important to watch in the forthcoming months,
especially if any are raised to the federal level, and perhaps instigate a circuit conflict
worthy of Supreme Court attention.
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